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SHIFT HAPPENS: PRESSURE ON FOREIGN
ATTORNEY-FEE PARADIGMS FROM CLASS
ACTIONS
THOMAS D. ROWE, JR.*
1

“You know what they say about paradigms—shift happens.”

I. INTRODUCTION
The class-action device, still unique in its degree of prevalence in
American civil litigation,2 has begun to spread—some would no doubt
3
Five Canadian
say metastasize —beyond the United States.
provinces now have some form of the device,4 as do the Australian

Copyright © 2003 by Thomas D. Rowe, Jr..
* Elvin R. Latty Professor of Law, Duke University. My thanks to the University of
Sydney Faculty of Law for its Parsons Fellow support during a visit in January-February 2002; to
the law faculties at Sydney and at Flinders University in Adelaide for hospitality and comments
on earlier versions of this paper; to Justice Murray Wilcox and his colleagues at the Federal
Court in Sydney for their help in understanding Australian class-action practice; and to Profs.
Antonio Gidi, Vince Morabito, William Rubenstein, and Garry Watson for comments on an
earlier draft of this essay. I am also greatly indebted to Herbert Bernstein for the learned help
he was always willing to give to amateur comparativists like myself. We all miss him. Errors
are, of course, mine.
1. A fairly widely encountered saying, with no apparent single originator. See, e.g., Bayou
Philosophy (attributing quotation to “a cybersage”) available at http://david_hewins.tripod.com/
floridacajun/id10.html (visited Sep. 16, 2002).
2. The statement in text is impressionistic, but class actions are available in American
federal courts, see FED. R. CIV. P. 23, and in all states but two, see generally, e.g., LINDA S.
MULLENIX, STATE CLASS ACTIONS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2000) (state-by-state
discussion of class-action rules, with only Mississippi and Virginia not generally providing for
them).
3. For a good, recent discussion of the controversies surrounding class actions in the
United States, see DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING
PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000). A shorter presentation drawing on the data and
observations of the Hensler et al. book is Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New
Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 179 (2001).
4. British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador, Ontario, Quebec, and Saskatchewan.
See, e.g.,, Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The Canadian Experience, 11 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 269 (2001) (describing class-action provisions and practice existing at the time in British
Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec). The Newfoundland/Labrador and Saskatchewan provisions
took effect in 2002 and are modeled after the British Columbia legislation. See Class Actions

125

5ROWE_FMT

126

09/10/03 4:13 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 13:125

Federal Court and the state of Victoria.5 For over a decade Brazil has
authorized collective actions on behalf of private parties by
designated government offices and by private associations with
relevant institutional purposes.6 The People’s Republic of China has
since 1991 provided for class-action-like representative lawsuits,7 and
the Indonesian Supreme Court recently adopted a regulation to
8
authorize and govern class actions. A Swedish law authorizing class
actions was to take effect January 1, 2003,9 and Finland, Norway, and
Scotland have considered or are considering adoption of the device.10
The South African Law Commission in 1998 recommended
recognition there of class and public-interest actions.11
This essay does not discuss these developments in depth; nor
does it wade into whether, and if so how, other nations should
implement class actions. Rather, it explores the tensions between the
class-action device and norms governing attorney-fee liability and
class-action financing practices in most of the world outside the
United States, the pressures resulting from those tensions, and

Act, S. Nfld. 2001 Ch. C-18.1 (in force Apr. 1, 2002); The Class Actions Act, S.S. Ch. C-12.01 (in
force Jan. 1, 2002).
5. See, e.g., S. Stuart Clark & Christina Harris, Multi-Plaintiff Litigation in Australia: A
Comparative Perspective, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 289 (2001).
6. See Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil: A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J.
COMP. L. (forthcoming 2003) (on file with author).
7. See Note, Class Action Litigation in China, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1523 (1998).
8. I attended an International Conference on Class Action Procedures and Their
Implementation in the Indonesian Judicial System in Jakarta in February 2002, and the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Indonesia has since issued a Regulation of the Supreme Court
Concerning Class Action Procedures (2002) (on file with author).
9. See Per Henrik Lindblom & Roberth Nordh, Scandinavian Developments: The New
Swedish Act on Group Actions (Sep. 13-14, 2002) (on file with author). For a published
description of the Swedish proposal at a late stage in its development, see Roberth Nordh,
Group Actions in Sweden: Reflections on the Purpose of Civil Litigation, the Need for Reforms,
and a Forthcoming Proposal, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 381 (2001). See also Per Henrik
Lindblom, Individual Litigation and Mass Justice: A Swedish Perspective and Proposal on Group
Actions in Civil Procedure, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 805 (1997) (discussing earlier Swedish proposal).
10. See Lindblom, supra note 9, at 824 (mentioning proposals put forward by stateappointed commissions in Finland, Norway, and Scotland); Norwegian Civil Procedure
Comm’n, Proposed Rules Concerning Group Action (provisional draft Feb. 2000) at
http://www.law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/ProposedRules.pdf (visited Sep. 21, 2002) .
11. South African Law Comm’n, The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest
Actions in South African Law (1998) at http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/salc/report/classact.pdf
(visited Sep. 16, 2002) . See also 3 COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO THE AFFAIRS OF THE
MASTERBOND GROUP AND INVESTOR PROTECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA, CORPORATE LAW
AND SECURITIES REGULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 651-953 (2001) (surveying studies and
practices in several nations and recommending adoption of class actions in South Africa) at
http://www.doj.gov.za/commissions/nelcommission/chapter15_18.pdf (visited Oct. 19, 2002).
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possible resolutions. Given differences among legal systems that
have, or might adopt, class actions, the essay also largely avoids
arguing for or against particular choices that might be made. I hope
that this exploration can, by clarifying some of the issues that are
likely to arise and the alternatives available, be useful where adoption
or modification of the class action is being or may be considered—
perhaps even including in the United States.
II. THE UNVIABILITY OF CLASS ACTIONS WITHOUT
CONTINGENT FEES AND UNDER
LOSER-PAYS ATTORNEY-FEE SHIFTING
As others have long recognized, class actions could find barren
soil if they were transplanted to systems that, like much of the world,
maintain bans on contingent fees for plaintiffs’ lawyers and adhere to
the near-universal loser-pays rule on liability for a winning side’s
attorney fees.12 The American class action exists in a system under
which losing plaintiffs are rarely, and losing defendants only
sometimes, liable for the attorney fees of their victorious
adversaries;13 contingent percentage fees are allowed and are the
dominant means for financing plaintiffs’ non-class and class damage

12. See, e.g., Donald N. Dewees et al., An Economic Analysis of Cost and Fee Rules for
Class Actions, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 155, 157 (1981) (“in England and Canada, the representative
plaintiff’s liability for the defendant’s costs in a losing action, his inability to demand
contribution by class members to the costs of the action regardless of the success or failure of
the action, and the widespread prohibition against contingent fees have together created a
situation where a representative plaintiff is never better off in economic terms bringing his
action in class rather than individual form”) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original); Per
Henrik Lindblom, Group Actions in Civil Procedure in Sweden, in SWEDISH NATIONAL
REPORTS TO THE XIIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 59, 92 (1990)
(“If the class action were adopted in Sweden today without changing our rules on costs, very
few such cases would be likely to be instituted.”) (italics omitted); Vince Morabito, Federal
Class Actions, Contingency Fees, and the Rules Governing Litigation Costs, 21 MONASH U.L.
REV. 231, 232 (1995) (“the existing costs rules governing litigation, if applied unaltered to class
actions, could constitute ‘a disincentive to bringing grouped proceedings and might in fact create
yet another barrier to access to legal remedies of the kind which the [class action] itself aims to
overcome’” (quoting AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, GROUPED PROCEEDINGS IN THE
FEDERAL COURT 106 (1988)); 3 ONTARIO LAW REVISION COMM’N, REPORT ON CLASS
ACTIONS 703 (1982) [hereinafter OLRC REPORT] (“the application of the existing Ontario
costs rules to class actions has resulted, and will continue to result, in the commencement of
very few class actions”).
13. See, e.g., 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§
2675, 2675.2 (3d ed. 1998) (describing general American practice and exceptions under federal
law).
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litigation;14 and entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyering—with attorneys
often being the main impetus behind, and principal persons
financially interested in, a class action for damages—is at least
tolerated.15 In nearly all the rest of the world, prevailing practices and
attitudes hew in varying degrees to an opposite paradigm in which
losers in civil litigation are usually liable for a substantial portion of
winners’ reasonable attorney fees (loser-pays or the English as
opposed to the American rule16); contingent fees—percentage or
hourly17—have been frowned upon, with the client at least in principle
obligated to pay the lawyer the same rate no matter whether success
18
be great, small, or nil; and lawyers’ financing of and stakeholding in
litigation have tended to be regarded as unacceptably commercial and
unprofessional.19 Moreover, financing of litigation by third parties

14. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal
Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 267 & n.1 (1998) (“The contingency fee is one of the defining
characteristics of civil litigation in the United States. . . . While a number of countries have
some form of contingency fee, the American contingency fee is relatively unique, both in its
form and its dominance as a means of funding litigation. What sets the American contingency
fee apart from contingency arrangements in most other countries is that it is based on a
percentage of recovery. . . .”).
15. See, e.g., Richard O. Faulk, Armageddon* Through Aggregation? The Use and Abuse
of Class Actions in International Dispute Resolution, 10 MICH. ST. U.-DCL J. INT’L L. 205, 210
& n.9 (2001) (referring to the “‘entrepreneurship’ of contingent fees” as “a hallmark of
American class action litigation that promotes risk-taking by the plaintiffs’ bar,” and citing
further sources).
16. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 651 (1982) (referring to loser-pays practice in England and
Continental nations).
17. Because of the prominence of the American contingent fee based on a percentage of
the recovery, it may often be assumed that the term “contingent fee” refers to such a contingent
percentage fee. But the element of contingency comes from the no-win, no-pay feature and is
independent of the means by which the amount of the fee is determined. The conditional fee
arrangement used in, for example, England, see infra note 29, is also a contingent fee but is
based on an hourly rate instead of a percentage of the recovery. This essay uses “contingent
fee” to refer to all forms of contingent fees, not just the American percentage variety, and
speaks more precisely when referring to a particular type of contingent fee.
18. See, e.g., Geoffrey Woodroffe, Loser Pays and Conditional Fees—An English
Solution?, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 345, 349-51 (1998) (describing historical roots of and rationales
for prohibition of contingent fees in England).
19. See, e.g., id. at 350 (giving, as rationale for unlawfulness of “champertous” contracts
under which lawyer would get share of proceeds of suit, that “if lawyers have a personal
financial interest in the outcome of cases so that their reward depends on the result of the
litigation, this may affect the objectivity and impartiality of their advice and undermine the
integrity of the administration of justice in that the lawyer as an officer of the court will have a
conflict of interest and be torn between self-interest and his or her duty to the court and to the
client”).
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aside from clients and their own lawyers could run afoul of the
traditional common-law barrier to “maintenance.”20
American practices are in several ways obviously hospitable to
the flourishing of plaintiffs’ class actions for damages. While small
chance of a significant recovery may (or at least should) deter the
pursuit of class claims, individual class representatives’ or class
members’ fear of down-side liability for large defense fees will not.
Nor need the class representative or members worry about paying the
class’s own attorneys in case of small or no recovery; the contingent
fee means that class counsel bears the risk of nonpayment. And class
counsel’s substantial percentage stake in a large recovery, even one
made up of many awards too small to be worth pursuing in individual
actions, can make it financially attractive for entrepreneurial
attorneys to front the considerable costs of class litigation if the
chance of eventual reward appears great enough.
By contrast, the contrary paradigm—which has prevailed in
varying degrees in civil-law and non-U.S. common-law systems
alike—would discourage significant use of plaintiffs’ class actions in
not one but several ways. Whatever the economies of litigation in
class form or the strength of a class’s claims, the class device increases
21
stakes and likely costs on both sides, threatening the one or few class
representatives with down-side liability for their own side’s and the
adversary’s fees that can be disproportionate to their share in a likely
class recovery.22 As Professor John Coffee has nicely put it in another
context, the prospective plaintiff may be looking at—and

20. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 965 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “maintenance” as
“[a]ssistance in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit given to a litigant by someone who has no
bona fide interest in the case; meddling in someone else’s litigation.”).
21. See, e.g., Morabito, supra note 12, at 233 (“Class proceedings tend to last longer and be
more complex than individual suits,” and safeguards to protect the interests of unnamed class
members “increase substantially the costs incurred by the representative plaintiff and render a
class suit a considerably more expensive form of litigation than individual proceedings”)
(footnotes omitted).
22. See, e.g., 3 OLRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 656 (footnote omitted):
[I]f the class action fails, the representative plaintiff will be liable for two sets of costs.
Even if the suit succeeds and there is the usual award of party and party costs [i.e., a
partial award of the winning plaintiff’s attorney fees], the representative plaintiff will
still have to pay to his own lawyer the amount that is not indemnified by the
defendant.
The extent of the potential liability of a representative plaintiff, whatever the
result of the suit, will be affected by the particular nature of class actions, which
ordinarily are more complex, lengthy proceedings than individual actions. There will
therefore be a commensurate increase in the ancillary expenses and lawyers’ fees.
This, of course, will augment the financial risk assumed by a representative plaintiff.
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understandably reluctant to enter into—a “one horse, one rabbit”
trade.23
The disincentives can work somewhat differently, albeit with
similar effect, whether class members’ individual claims are large or
small. A small claim, even a strong one, may not be economically
viable on its own and therefore unlikely to be pursued in an
24
individual action. Yet despite the purpose of class actions to make
such claims economically viable when pooled,25 it may be hard to find
a willing representative with such a claim to take advantage of the
pooling benefits of a class action, given the threat of large costs in the
event of defeat or even quite small recovery; hence such claims will
26
tend to be pursued if at all in individual rather than class form. And
the client who has an individually viable larger claim, while more
likely to proceed in the first place, will most probably prefer to pursue
the claim on its own rather than in a class action, if the client’s
recovery will be about the same in the event of success in either form
but with the down-side fee liability risks smaller if the claim proceeds
by itself.27

23. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on
the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1643 (1989).
24. Loser-pays fee shifting may encourage strong small claims more than does the
American rule. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting,
47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 148-49 (Winter 1984). As the text goes on to discuss,
however, such fee liability is also highly likely to discourage the choice of class over individual
litigation if the claim is being pursued at all.
25. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.)
(“Class actions. . . may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to
litigate individually. For example, this lawsuit involves claims averaging about $100 per
plaintiff; most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action were not
available.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 585-86 (6th ed. 2003) (“The
modern class action generalizes [the] technique . . . [of] aggregating a number of small claims
into one large enough to justify the costs of suit—or, stated otherwise, . . . realizing economies of
scale in litigation.”).
26. See, e.g., Morabito, supra note 12, at 233-34 (“Potential representative plaintiffs whose
claims are individually non-recoverable would be unlikely to commence class actions as the
extent of their potential liability for costs would exceed the value of their own claim.”)
(footnotes omitted); OLRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 659 (“A modest claim will not defray the
solicitor and client costs payable to the class lawyer after a successful action, let alone justify the
risk of bearing party and party costs.”). “Solicitor and client” costs are those “payable by a
client to his own lawyer,” id. at 647, including attorney fees, while “party and party” costs are
“payable to a successful party by his unsuccessful adversary,” id. Usually, party and party
“indemnity is only partial.” Id. at 649.
27. See, e.g., Morabito, supra note 12, at 234 (“In relation to those potential class
representatives . . . whose claims are individually recoverable, individual proceedings constitute
a more appealing option than grouped proceedings as they involve lower costs.”) (footnotes
omitted); OLRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 659 (“A person with an individually recoverable
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These kinds of risks to individual clients, to be sure, can lead to
some form of risk-pooling or performance of an insurance function.
That is precisely the role played by an entrepreneurial American
plaintiffs’ class-action law firm working for a contingent fee, typically
handling a portfolio of multiple cases so that success in some can
subsidize those that yield little or no recovery and finance cases still in
process. Under the contrary paradigm—which of course may not
exist in pure form anywhere,28 and which has been diluted in some
systems in recent years29 (but the existence of pressures for such
changes is precisely a main point of this essay)—the risks are greater
than under American approaches and the means of dealing with them
more limited. Not only would the loser-pays rule pose the threat of a
class plaintiff’s being out of pocket for the other side’s large fees in
the event of defeat; but a ban on no-win, no-pay contingent fees
would keep the plaintiffs’ attorney from bearing the risk of no or
small recovery and spreading that risk across multiple cases—thus imclaim is better advised to bring his own action against the defendant, rather than incur the more
onerous financial costs of a class action, which can bring him no greater material advantage.”).
28. Actual practice in some systems has long involved moderation of the paradigm
described in the text. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee Arrangements and Fee Shifting: Lessons
from the Experience in Ontario, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 130-32 (Winter 1984)
(describing de facto existence of contingent fees in Ontario, from plaintiffs’ lawyers’ tendencies
not to collect fees owed by losing plaintiffs and from charging of prevailing plaintiffs based
partly on amounts recovered, despite formal disapproval of contingent billing).
29. Recent developments in some nations, under pressures to reduce the cost of legal-aid
programs and to improve access to civil justice, have moved away from the text’s paradigm in
the American direction, even for non-class actions. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, An American
Hamburger Stand in St. Paul’s Cathedral: Replacing Legal Aid with Conditional Fees in English
Personal Injury Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 253 (2001) (recounting history of adoption of
contingent hourly fees in England); Woodroffe, supra note 18 (same); Editorial, Contingency
Fees: A Case of Too Little, Too Late, DE REBUS, July 1999 (criticizing new South African
measures allowing contingent hourly fees as lagging behind recent spread in practice of
contingent percentage fees) available at http://www.derebus.org.za/archives/1999Jul/editorial/
editeng.htm (visited Sep. 22, 2002). What I have described as a “contingent hourly”
arrangement to distinguish it from the American contingent percentage fee is known, perhaps
because of historic British aversion to the idea of the contingent fee, as a “conditional fee
agreement” or CFA. Under a CFA,
the lawyer would usually receive nothing if the case were lost, but would receive a
basic fee plus a success fee if the case were won or settled with a payment to the client.
. . . [T]he . . .CFA involves a basic fee which is based on the lawyer’s hours worked at
an agreed hourly fee and the success fee is a percentage increase of the basic fee. . . .
The success fee may never be more than 100% of the basic fee.
Christopher Hodges, Multi-Party Actions: A European Approach, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
321, 351 (2001) (footnote omitted). In this essay I am not assuming that the paradigm exists in
pure form in other nations nor implying that class actions would be the only source of pressure
to move away from it. What I do maintain is that creating of viable class-action devices elsewhere would be virtually certain to require some modifications to the paradigm, and that the
existence of class actions will create particularly acute pressures for changes.
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posing the risk of being liable for the probably large fees of class
counsel upon individual clients who are less equipped and likely less
disposed to take it on in the first place.30 In short, the realities of
litigation finance and risk allocation under the contra-American
paradigm would make for little if any class damage litigation, except
possibly when success and substantial recovery looked virtually
certain—and even then the incentive structure might lead to the
choice of litigation in individual rather than class form.31
For damage class actions to be viable, then, something—or more
than one thing—would have to give. The rest of this essay explores
possibilities for modifications in the contra-American paradigm that
could make class litigation practically feasible. A preliminary and
non-exhaustive word may be in order about basic desiderata—goals
to be sought in choosing cost approaches if a system does opt to have
some form of class action. The class action is meant to further various
ends, including access to civil justice, enforcement of public norms,
efficiency in resolution of mass controversies, and repose for
defendants who prevail or pay a class-action judgment or settlement.
An additional valid concern is what can be called filtering or screening—trying to calibrate incentives so that access comes, at least as
little as possible, at the cost of making it feasible for nuisance or strike
suits to be brought.32 Further, any system would want to take into
30. This introductory sketch oversimplifies somewhat, because alternatives to contingent
fees such as public funding might substitute for the financial risk-bearing role of the plaintiff
class’s attorney. Later discussion takes account of such possibilities, see infra notes 43-51, 78-79
and accompanying text; but the essential point remains that some alternative to the bearing of
large risk for paying class counsel’s fee by the individual class representatives is necessary for a
viable class-action regime. And contingent fees in some form are the most prominent of the
alternatives.
31. See, e.g., OLRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 663 (“the existing costs rules have the effect
of discouraging all class actions, for reasons having nothing to do with their propriety or
merits”).
The main focus of this essay is on cost rules in class actions for damages, not such actions
for prospective relief like injunctions or declaratory judgments. Relief in actions challenging
policies affecting many may have the same effect whether the action is in individual or class
form; an injunction against enforcing an invalid law will or at least should keep the government
from enforcing it at all, even if the litigation is not formally a class action. Hence the problems
with cost rules in class actions are likely to be less unique and acute in suits seeking prospective
relief as opposed to damages. Also, contingent fees out of recoveries are viable only in damage
actions and thus deserve discussion in that context alone. Incentive problems with loser-pays
rules can of course occur in injunctive and declaratory actions, but for the most part they
probably call for similar responses—whatever those may be—in class and nonclass litigation.
32. See Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It”:
Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 140
(Spring/Summer 2001) (seeking “to identify mechanisms for enhancing the system’s capacity to
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account norms of particular domestic concern, such as the balance it
seeks between private and public enforcement and the types of
professional conduct it would like to tolerate or encourage—although
concerns for access and law enforcement without high public
expenditure may force rethinking of some such norms.
Again, I am not advocating class actions, at all or in any
particular form, for the rest of the world; but given the limited spread
of class actions elsewhere in recent decades, and the interest being
33
shown in some systems that have not yet adopted the device, I hope
it will be useful to explore the available fee-liability alternatives. The
possibilities are numerous, which poses for other systems the
intriguing chance of choosing approaches that seem best suited to
yield class litigation of a nature and scale suited to a legal system’s
norms and perceived needs. Adoption of the class action need not, in
other words, involve a headlong plunge into what for many may be
uninviting American waters. And modifications of the contraAmerican paradigm are already numerous enough in practice to
provide some experience in seeing how they really work, not just
speculating about how they might.
III. COMPENSATING THE PLAINTIFF CLASS’S COUNSEL
To start with the plaintiff’s side’s own lawyer’s fees: If
disapproval of contingent fees is not somehow relaxed, the options
are limited and damage class actions are likely to be few. Even in
successful cases, the individual class representative cannot practically
be liable for all of the fees of class counsel. However reckoned, on an
hourly or percentage or some hybrid or other basis, any solicitor-andscreen out non-meritorious suits, while preserving access for meritorious actions”). There is
also the possibility of trying to rely on other approaches than cost rules, such as various possible
tests for certification of class actions, to perform the screening function:
[A]n action should be allowed to proceed as a class action only after it has received
judicial approval, upon satisfaction of a number of certification tests. These tests are
intended to act as a filter, allowing only proper, meritorious class actions to be brought
in Ontario. This purpose is particularly evident in the incorporation of a preliminary
test on the merits and a “cost-benefit” test, the latter of which permits the court to
refuse to certify a class action if it is of the view that the adverse effects of the
proceedings would outweigh its benefits. In light of the purposes of the certification
tests—to weed out inappropriate class actions—we believe that it is neither necessary
nor appropriate for the costs rules to be assigned a similar function.
OLRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 663 (footnote omitted). However a system chooses to pursue
the screening or filtering function, it is important to have some checks on abuse and overuse of
the class device. And if cost rules can be set so as to calibrate incentives at desirable levels, they
have the advantage of requiring less judicial management than other approaches.
33. See supra notes 10-11 (proposals for class actions in Finland, Norway, Scotland, and
South Africa).
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client fees owing after an award of party-and-party fees34 against the
defendant could still exceed, or at least greatly diminish, the
individual representative’s share of the class recovery and make
claimants unwilling to play the necessary role of representative. And
to deal with possible lack of success, a rule of individualrepresentative liability if seriously enforced (ignoring the rules is
always one possibility, although it seems better to set up systems in
which participants don’t predictably have to do so) would at the least
threaten to eliminate all but sure-thing class actions. If there cannot
be some form of risk-spreading or risk-shifting, one way of dealing
with risks is always not to take them in the first place.35
A. Liability of Unnamed Class Members
In theory, it might be possible to look to class members other
than the representatives to share in paying the fees of class counsel,
but none of the possible ways of doing so seems particularly
promising. Trying to rely on voluntary contributions—in effect,
passing the hat among the class members—would almost certainly not
be viable on a regular basis, given the opportunities for free riding
36
presented by class actions. Efforts at collecting from class members
by some involuntary means (other than taking the fee out of a
recovery before distribution to class members, and in the event of
success only—which is exactly what a contingent fee does) would
encounter huge problems of administration, cost, and collection,
especially if the class were numerous and scattered and all the more if
the individual members’ claims were small. Moreover, damage class
actions—involving distinct claims that class members are legally
entitled to bring on their own—would likely have to have the
34. For definitions of these terms, and explanation that “party-and-party” fees awarded to
winners are usually partial (thus leaving a remainder owed by client to counsel), see supra note
26.
35. It would be possible to allow some sort of bonus payment to class representatives out of
recoveries in winning cases to compensate for disproportionate costs they would have to bear if
liable for all of class counsel’s fees, but such an approach would leave unsolved the serious
incentive problems resulting from the chance of defeat—with fee liability still existing if no form
of contingent fee arrangement were allowed or subsidy provided.
36. Professor Morabito attributes the “reluctance of most, if not all, absent class members
to contribute to the expenses of the suit”
to two major factors. In the first place, class members will be able to enjoy the benefits
flowing from a successful class suit whether or not they provide any financial assistance
to the representative plaintiff. Another reason for this reluctance is due to the
remoteness of any potential benefit at the time the request for contributions is
normally made, namely, in the early stages of the proceedings.
Morabito, supra note 12, at 236 (footnotes omitted).
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American opt-out feature;37 and a notice to class members that they
might face down-side liability could produce an opt-out stampede on
the part of those who pay any attention to such notices, perhaps
leaving an unviable class action and in any event subverting the end
of economically wrapping up most or all of a widespread controversy
in a single proceeding.
These concerns could lead to consideration of an opt-in
approach, which might be viable for some actions involving large
claims and at least fairly high likelihood of success. The choice facing
such claimants could be between proceeding with an individual action
and probably having to pay a fairly high fee to one’s own attorney win
or lose (still assuming that contingent fees were not allowed), versus
38
opting into a class action with the economies of scale that could yield
a larger net recovery or at least smaller fees for each member to pay
to class counsel in case of defeat. This is, indeed, the approach taken
in English rules on group litigation adopted in 2000,39 which is too
recent for any evaluation of the success of the scheme.40 Such an optin approach, in any event, would be highly unlikely to work for smallclaim class actions, given both notice costs to numerous prospective
class members and probable lack of interest on the part of many in
signing up to be part of an effort to get at most small individual
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (“The notice [in any common-question class action maintained
under Rule 23(b)(3)] shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude the member from
the class if the member so requests by a specified date . . .”). For a defense of mass-tort class
actions with no opt-out feature, see David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Actions: The
Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002).
38. If any action were brought in class form at all, which for reasons discussed supra in note
27 and accompanying text it quite likely would not be—even with claims large enough and
promising enough to be worth pursuing in individual lawsuits.
39. See Neil Andrews, Multi-Party Proceedings in England: Representative and Group
Actions, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 249, 260 (2001)) (footnotes omitted):
Those wishing to join and take advantage of group litigation under the 2000 rules must
either affirmatively register as parties to the relevant claim, or at least have their
particular claims adjoined by judicial consolidation to the group action. Therefore,
group actions involve positive opting-in, or at least a positive decision to litigate.
40. See id. at 266 (“the newly refined 2000 model of group litigation orders must be allowed
time to prove itself”). There are, though, reasons for pessimism. An opt-in regime existed for
some time in the Australian state of Victoria. See David Kell, The Liability of Represented
Persons for Party-Party Costs in Representative Actions, 13 CIV. JUST. Q. 233, 236 (1994)
(“persons to be represented must ‘opt in’ by expressing in writing their consent to being
represented”). This requirement was criticized, see Clark & Harris, supra note 5, at 294 n.27,
and “[n]o proceedings ever progressed to final hearing under these provisions,” id. at 295. The
Victoria scheme was replaced in 2000 by “a class action procedure virtually identical to that of
the Federal Court,” id. at 292, which provides for an opt-out rather than an opt-in mechanism,
see id. at 299-300. See also Hensler & Rowe, supra note 32, at 144-47 (critiquing opt-in proposals).
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recoveries. This setup would result, for better or worse, in the class
device not serving the end that some in the United States and
elsewhere see as an important function of class actions—the ability to
force disgorgement of gains from, and thus act as a deterrent to,
widespread small rip-offs.41
B. Third-Party Funding and Contingent Fees
These difficulties make it sensible for a system considering class
actions to relax, if it has not done so already, the requirement that
clients—class representatives, the represented class members, or
both—be liable for the fees of class counsel in the event of defeat or
for payment of a full fee in case of only a small recovery. The risk of
limited or no success would then have to be borne by either counsel
for the plaintiff class under some form of contingent-fee system, or by
a third party such as a legal-aid program, a special fund to finance
class actions, or perhaps in some cases an association or union with
interest in the subject matter of the litigation. (There appears to be
no imperative to choose only a single one of these mechanisms; class
counsel might be allowed to decide they were willing to take cases on
a no-win, no-pay basis while there also existed, say, a public fund to
support class actions—which could also be useful to help with actions
other than damage cases that might be meritorious but less likely to
produce a recovery as a source for a substantial fee.) The lastmentioned approach, financing by an organization such as an
association or union, seems innocuous—at least under modern
42
relaxed attitudes about maintenance —and even useful if a group has
the interest and resources, but unlikely to be forthcoming often
enough to be a source principally relied upon.
1. Third-party funding. Professor Vince Morabito’s 1995
43
article nicely presented the issues and experience up to then in the
Australian context, with reference to Canadian developments as well,

41. See, e.g., Hensler & Rowe, supra note 32, at 146 n.30 (discussing possible effect of
change to opt-in approach on enforceability of consumer-protection legislation); FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3) Committee Note to 1966 amendment (“a fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by
the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class action . . . .”).
42. See supra note 20; Michael Zander, Will the Revolution in the Funding of Civil
Litigation in England Eventually Lead to Contingency Fees?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 259, 259-60
(2002) (mentioning historic disapproval of maintenance and 1966 Law Commission report
detailing forms of maintenance already allowed then, such as litigation funding by trade unions
and associations).
43. Morabito, supra note 12.
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and this part of my essay will do little more than summarize and
update. Legal-aid organizations might be authorized to fund class
actions, and even to profit from financing of successful cases, but
could probably provide at most a limited response. It would be a
diversion from their core mission of meeting the legal needs of those
with limited means to authorize their funding of class actions that
include those not eligible for legal aid, while the problems of
financing class actions are largely independent of the means of the
potential class representatives and members.44 Yet if legal-aid groups
could fund only actions on behalf of those meeting eligibility criteria,
the response to the barriers to viable class actions would be only
partial and the resulting system perhaps rickety.45 In the United
States, furthermore, class actions conducted by the federal Legal
Services Corporation’s grantees proved politically controversial
enough to lead to a Congressional restriction on such litigation.46
For a system preferring to include some regulatory element
instead of leaving matters entirely to the private market by reliance
on contingent fees, the creation of public funds dedicated to financing
class actions could be preferable to legal-aid funding. The funds can
be designed to be self-perpetuating after an initial appropriation,
taking reimbursement for money paid to the class representatives
plus a modest percentage of awards in successful cases. Such funds
exist in Ontario and Quebec, and have been proposed in Australia.47
The experience in the two Canadian provinces has contrasted

44. See OLRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 661:
[T]he principle upon which legal aid is granted in individual actions—the
impecuniosity of the plaintiff—does not address the economic problem faced by a
prospective plaintiff in the class action context. His dilemma is not necessarily a lack
of financial resources, but rather the fact that the potentially enormous costs of
litigation so exceed the amount of his personal stake that, regardless of his resources, it
would not be economically rational to initiate a class action.
45. If legal-aid financial-eligibility criteria were “applied not just in relation to the financial
means of the representative plaintiff but also to the means of all class members,” that would
create “obvious administrative problems, especially in opt out schemes which do not require the
identification of, and the express consent to the bringing of the class suit by, the class members.”
Morabito, supra note 12, at 264 (footnote omitted).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(d)(5) (2000) (“No class action suit, class action appeal, or amicus
curiae class action may be undertaken, directly or through others, by a staff attorney, except
with the express approval of a project director of a recipient in accordance with policies
established by the governing body of such recipient.”).
47. See Morabito, supra note 12, at 265-70 (discussing funds in Quebec and Ontario, and
proposals by Australian Law Reform Commission, South Australian Law Reform Committee,
and Australian Access to Justice Advisory Committee).

5ROWE_FMT

138

09/10/03 4:13 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 13:125

significantly, with the Quebec fund being quite active48 and the
Ontario one relatively inactive49—which suggests the need for
adequate funding and careful attention to the features of the funds.
The Quebec fund illustrates both the possibility of coexistence with
private financing and the possibility of including a potentially
desirable assessment of the substantive merit of the claim as part of
the decision whether to provide funding.50 Since the greater
significance of these funds appears to be in connection with
protection of class members from liability for fees of winning
defendants,51 further discussion will be saved until later.
2. Contingent fees. Third-party funding can play a valuable
role, but it is subject to the generosity, interests, and assessments of
others besides class members and counsel—and, in the case of public
funding, to political swings and governmental budget priorities.
48. See FONDS D’AIDE AUX RECOURS COLLECTIFS, RAPPORT ANNUEL 1999-2000, at 9
(2000) (during period 1985-2000, annual average of 51 requests for aid presented to Quebec
fund); id. at 10 (total of 1026 requests made to fund from 1978 to 2000); id. at 11 (“from 1985 to
2000, the Fund has approved 84.7% and has denied 14.3% of the requests on which a decision
has been made”) (translation by author); id. at 12 (from 1985 through 1999, Quebec fund
financed on average 65.5% of class actions docketed each year in Quebec superior court).
49. See Watson, supra note 4, at 275-76 (Ontario Class Proceedings Fund “has been a
failure in that, due to inadequate financing, it has given funding to very few class actions
(approximately six to date).”) (footnote omitted). An additional reason for limited use of the
fund could be caution induced by heavy exposure to defense fees in case of defeat: “Once the
[Class Proceedings] Committee decides to provide the applicant with some financial assistance
in relation to the class suit’s disbursements, the Committee automatically becomes liable for any
costs that are awarded against the financially assisted class plaintiff, no matter how modest the
grant from the Fund happened to be.” Morabito, supra note 12, at 266 (footnote omitted). An
additional reason, though, could be lack of need: “[A]pplications to the fund have been few
(approximately thirty cases), and most importantly, the ‘big, successful’ cases have not applied.”
Watson, supra, at 276 (footnote omitted). Apparently, “class actions are alive and well in
Ontario without a successfully functioning Fund”). Id. at 277. For a description of the Ontario
fund’s procedures and standards for awards, see WARD K. BRANCH, CLASS ACTIONS IN
CANADA at 8-1 to 8-4 (2002).
50. See Morabito, supra note 12, at 265 (Quebec fund’s criteria include whether action can
proceed without its assistance and, in case of actions not yet judicially certified, whether cause
of action appears valid); id. at 266 (“Since contingency fee arrangements are permitted in
Quebec, they can be combined with financial assistance” from the fund).
51. See Garry D. Watson, Ontario’s New Class Proceedings Legislation—An Analysis, in
GUIDE TO CASE MANAGEMENT AND CLASS PROCEEDINGS 1, 7 (Garry D. Watson & M.
McGowan eds., 1995) (“the most important and significant step in class proceedings may not be
in court, but will be the class representative’s application to the Class Proceedings Committee
for what will be (in form) a request for disbursement funding, but is in reality a desire to obtain
an immunity from the ‘downside risk’ of liability for the defendant’s costs”). Significantly,
British Columbia, which has virtually abolished fee shifting in class actions, see Watson, supra
note 4, at 277, alone among the three Canadian provinces with long-established class actions
apparently has no such fund.
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Subject instead to a financial self-interest that may be more nearly
aligned to that of class representatives and members is, of course, one
or another form of contingent fee under which class counsel is paid
only in the event of success (by judgment or, as a practical matter
more often, settlement) and out of the class recovery. Movement
toward contingent fees as a way of financing plaintiffs’ damage
litigation, along with cutbacks in costly legal aid, has already taken
place in the context of individual actions in England;52 and, despite
occasional assumptions to the contrary,53 there is nothing
incompatible about having contingent fees and retaining the loser54
pays rule if a system wants to do so. Plaintiffs can remain liable for
the fees of successful defendants while not being obligated to pay
their own lawyer if they lose. Turning the class’s lawyer into an
insurer by shifting the risk of nonpayment to the lawyer calls, of
course, for a premium in the form of some increase over what would
be at least theoretically risk-free alternative work at an hourly or
otherwise fixed rate, and the question then becomes how to reckon
the premium.
The main alternatives in use are some form of the American
contingent percentage fee, taken from the whole recovery on the
55
long-established “common fund” theory, and an hourly rate with a
bonus. The latter appears in the United States with the “lodestar”
approach of multiplying hours reasonably spent on successful aspects
of a case times a reasonable market-based hourly rate,56 with the addition of a premium for success,57 and in England and Australia as the
52. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 29.
53. See, e.g., Faulk, supra note 15, at 210 (footnote omitted):
The “entrepreneurship” of contingent fees, a hallmark of American class action
litigation that promotes risk-taking by the plaintiffs’ bar, seems flatly incompatible
with the “fee shifting” tradition of most other nations, which discourages litigants and
their counsel from taking similar risks.
54. See, e.g., Michael Zander, If conditional fees, why not contingency fees?, 152 NEW L.J.
797, 798 (2002):
It has been argued that if [contingency fees] were allowed, the English fee shifting rule
would have to go and that each side would bear its own costs as in the USA. This is
not a necessary consequence of permitting contingency fees. In Canada, every
province except Ontario permits contingency fees in the full sense of a percentage of
the damages but every province adheres to the English rule that costs follow the
event. . . .
55. See generally, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 930-32 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing theory of and issues arising under common-fund
idea for attorney-fee recovery).
56. See, e.g., id. at 921-24 (discussing lodestar calculations).
57. See, e.g., id. at 932-33 (discussing contingency enhancements and their justifications;
their rejection as an element of a shifted fee by U.S. Supreme Court in City of Burlington v.
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“conditional” fee based on the lawyer’s hourly rate with an “uplift”—
in both those nations, capped at some percentage above what would
have been the hourly-based fee.58 The amount of the uplift affects
how risky a case a lawyer has an incentive to take—with a 100%
uplift providing an incentive for a risk-neutral lawyer to take cases
with as low as a 50% odds of success, and lower amounts encouraging
only cases with better chances—thus permitting a system to
encourage or discourage riskier litigation. While both calculation
approaches rely to some extent on private incentives and
arrangements, in the class context neither can operate with the degree
of freedom from judicial control that characterizes non-class litigation. Given the potential for conflict between a class lawyer and
class members, with the lawyer having a greater self-interest in
maximizing the fee than the return to individual members, court
control of awards—as of other aspects of terms when class actions are
settled—is essential. Indeed, difficulties with settlements and fees of
class counsel in the United States have led to recent proposals for
amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 that would
increase court scrutiny of counsel selection, settlement terms, and fee
awards.59
A system adopting a class-action procedure or contemplating a
change in its attorney-fee regime for existing class actions could also
consider experimenting with some form of a simple but sophisticated
proposal made by Professor Kevin Clermont and John Currivan to
deal with many conflict and incentive problems with both contingent
percentage and hourly fees: a hybrid contingent hourly-percentage
fee. The fee, payable only in the event of success, would be “the sum
of two simple components: (1) the lawyer’s time charge for the hours
devoted to the case, and (2) a percentage of the amount by which the

Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); and their persistence in federal-court common-fund cases—in which
awards come from the plaintiffs’ side’s recovery, rather than from the losing defendant—and in
some state systems).
58. The Australian state of Victoria limits the uplift to 25%, See Vince Morabito,
Contingency fees in federal class actions, LAW INST. J., Dec. 1999, at 86, 87. In England—which
does not have something closely resembling the class actions that exist in the United States,
Canada, and Australia, see Andrews, supra note 39—the uplift is capped at 100%. See Woodroffe, supra note 18, at 353-54.
59. See Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, May 20, 2002, at 101-22 (proposing
and describing amendments concerning class-action settlement approval, appointment of class
counsel, and attorney fee awards) at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2002/CVRulesJC.pdf
(visited Sep. 28, 2002); Ammendments to Federal Procedure Rules, 71 U.S.L.W. 4253-55 (2003)
(Supreme Court promulgating class-action rule amendments, to take effect December 1, 2003).
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gross recovery exceeds that time charge.”60 This is not the place to
expound on the merits of one particular proposal, or to venture near
the large theoretical literature on incentive effects of various fee
arrangements. More important is the point that a range of possible
approaches to contingent fees exists, offering opportunities for
different systems to choose ones that seem to suit best their norms
and needs. In particular, systems with reservations about perceived
American excesses have open to them alternatives with the potential
to make for workable class actions without the sometimes very large
fees and acute counsel-class conflicts that cause much controversy in
the United States.
IV. LOSER-PAYS ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING
When a plaintiff class wins a damage recovery, loser-pays liability
for attorneys’ fees—if retained for class actions—should work with
not much greater difficulty than in non-class litigation. Cases tried to
a judgment for the plaintiff class could be treated through usual costtaxing procedures; in negotiations and settlements fee liability would
be an element to be added to the recovery, subject to the sometimes
problematic judicial scrutiny that is a necessary part of a class-action
61
settlement.
The rub would come when the class lost—or, more precisely, in
the difficulties and disincentives created by the ex ante prospect of
having to pay at least a substantial part of a winning defendant’s
reasonable attorney fees should a class action go to a litigated
judgment for the defendant. The two most obvious possible sources
for the payment, the individual representative(s) and the class as a
62
whole, are largely non-starters. For reasons discussed above, the
threat of down-side liability for large defense fees along with those of
class counsel would at least mostly scare off potential class
60. Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 529, 547 (1978). Something resembling the hybrid fee may be used in
Canada: “The court determines the fees for class counsel, typically using a combination of a
multiplier test (i.e., hours worked multiplied by the hourly rate) and a percentage contingency
fee.” Watson, supra note 4, at 277 (footnote omitted). For critique of the Clermont & Currivan
proposal with suggestions for refinements, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion:
The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 44-46, 48
(Summer 1985).
61. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (mentioning proposal to amend Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23 to increase judicial scrutiny of proposed class-action settlements). For
discussion of difficulties with judicial review of proposed settlements, and of possible
improvements, see HENSLER ET AL., supra note 3, at 86-93, 486-90.
62. See supra note 12 and text accompanying notes 21-27.
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representatives, defeating the class device’s purposes of promoting
access, economical processing, and repose.63 Similarly, looking to
members of a losing class seems at least as unpromising to collect the
fees of a winning defendant as it does to pay the fees of the class’s
own lawyer,64 and is either banned or not provided for in Canada65
and Australia.66

63. Professor Watson reports that some class actions do take place in Ontario, which has
loser-pays fee liability for class actions albeit with some exceptions plus a public fund that
supports a few such cases, and speculates on how the problems of potential class-representative
liability are being handled:
Although it is not clear what is happening “out in the field,” possibly plaintiff class
counsels are not properly advising representative plaintiffs of the risks involved, are
choosing judgment-proof plaintiffs, or are agreeing to indemnify the representative
plaintiff for the costs of the action. If the former—if plaintiff class counsels are not
informing their clients of the risks—a malpractice action might be necessary to clear
the air.
Watson, supra note 4, at 275.
Clark and Harris report somewhat parallel evasion in Australia:
Needless to say, plaintiffs’ lawyers are often careful to nominate as the representative
party a person of straw—that is to say, someone who has no assets and who is
therefore incapable of satisfying any significant order for costs made in favor of the
defendant. Defendants have responded to this tactic by seeking what is known as an
order for security for costs against the plaintiff. This is an order that can be made by
the court requiring a plaintiff to pay into court, or otherwise give security for, an
amount equal to the estimated costs of the proceedings—including attorney’s fees.
Clark & Harris, supra note 5, at 302. See generally Vince Morabito, Security for Costs and Class
Actions in the Federal Court of Australia, 20 CIV. JUST. Q. 225 (2001) (surveying and criticizing
practice concerning security for costs). The tactics described by Clark and Harris reflect but do
not seem to address adequately the underlying difficulty of the disincentives created by
traditional cost and fee rules. Moreover, they raise questions about the adequacy of the class
representative and the ethics of class counsel’s conduct. If possible, it is preferable to face the
problems directly and adopt approaches that do not elicit such maneuvers.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37 (discussing obstacles to having unnamed class
members contribute to fees of class counsel).
65. In both Ontario and Quebec, the unnamed class members can be liable only with
respect to determinations on their individual claims. See, e.g., Terrence J. O’Sullivan, The future
of financing class actions in Ontario: considerations arising from a review of bills 28 and 29, in
CLASS ACTIONS IN ONTARIO AND QUEBEC: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST YVES PRATTE
CONFERENCE 81, 99 (A. Prujiner & J. Roy eds., 1992) (Ontario); Larry M. Fox, Liability for
costs: a comparison of bill 28 and bill 29 and the Quebec legislation, in id. at 123, 136 (Quebec).
British Columbia, the remaining Canadian province that has for some time provided for class
litigation, follows the American rule for such actions, so that neither the class representative nor
class members are generally liable for defense fees in a losing case. See, e.g., MICHAEL A.
EIZENGA ET AL., CLASS ACTIONS LAW AND PRACTICE § 12.3, at 12.1-12.2 (1999) (“Costs may
only be awarded in the event that the court concludes: that the class proceeding itself, or an
appeal from a class proceeding, has been conducted in a frivolous, vexatious, or abusive
manner” or in other limited circumstances); John A. Campion & Victoria A. Stewart, Class
Actions: Procedure and Strategy, 19 ADVOCATES’ Q. 20, 42 (1997).
66. See Clark & Harris, supra note 5, at 301-02 n.72 (“There is currently no provision for
members of an unsuccessful class to be ordered to contribute to costs, even where the plaintiff
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If it would not be consistent with viable class actions to have
either class representatives or class members liable for counsel fees of
winning defendants, the question then becomes what the alternatives
might be. Four principal possibilities seem to exist: making class
counsel liable; commercial insurance; public funding; and—what
might be, along with contingent fees, the most wrenching paradigm
shift—abolishing or sharply limiting the loser-pays rule for class
actions. The rest of this part briefly discusses each alternative in turn.
A. Liability of Class Counsel
One way of viewing the liability of class counsel for fees of
winning defendants would be as an extension of the principle behind
the contingent fee, with counsel bearing the risk of liability for the
other side’s fee as they already do with the risk of nonpayment of
their own fee in the event of defeat. Professor Deborah Hensler and
I explored the possibility of either-way loser-pays for damage class
actions, with plaintiffs’-side fee liability on class counsel, in the
American context—where losers, and especially losing plaintiffs, are
67
usually not liable for winning defendants’ fees—in a recent article.
Viewing the losing plaintiff class’s lawyer as unsuccessful

has insufficient finances to satisfy any costs order.”); Morabito, supra note 12, at 239 (“partyparty costs are to be borne only by the representative plaintiff and not by the class members”).
Under England’s new group-litigation procedure with its opt-in feature, by contrast,
participation will involve liability for costs:
Consistent with the basic [loser-pays] costs rule, members of a group claim will incur
liability for the opponent’s costs if the group loses the action. Group members’ costs
liability to the victorious opponent might be comp[o]sed of two elements. First, a
group litigant’s liability with respect to other members of the group will be “an equal
proportion, together with all the other group litigants, of the common costs.” . . . The
second and additional element of costs payable by an individual group litigant is the
amount of individual costs incurred by the defendant in meeting that particular
litigant’s claim.
Andrews, supra note 39, at 261-62 (footnotes omitted) (quoting CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES
48.6A(4)(b) (U.K.)). See generally CHRISTOPHER HODGES, MULTI-PARTY ACTIONS 135-204
(2001) (discussing financing of multi-party actions in England and Wales via legal-expense
insurance, conditional fee arrangements, and public funding).
67. Hensler & Rowe, supra note 32, at 152-59. For a critique of our idea, see Marc I.
Gross, Loser-Pays—or Whose “Fault” Is It Anyway: A Response to Hensler-Rowe’s “Beyond ‘It
Just Ain’t Worth It,’” 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163 (Spring/Summer 2001). See also
Morabito, supra note 12, at 253 (liability of class counsel for winning defendant’s fees “would
exacerbate the conflict of interest problem and . . . would increase substantially the
compensation that would need to be paid to the lawyer if the case succeeded.”) (footnote
omitted). See generally Dewees et al., supra note 12 (analyzing economic viability of alternative
class-action fee-liability arrangements including some with class lawyer bearing risk, and finding
that some such rules including loser-pays fee shifting with attorney liability could make for
economically viable class actions without encouraging claims with low chance of success).
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entrepreneur rather than malefactor deserving sanctions, we
emphasized the possibly favorable access and screening effects of the
ex ante prospect of fee recovery and threat of fee liability.68
We recognized, though, that many complex details would
69
accompany and perhaps bedevil such a rule, cautioning that the positive access and screening effects of loser-pays with class-attorney
liability “might be quite small, and the practical challenges of grafting
such a rule onto our civil justice system might turn out to be so high
70
that it [would] not [be] worth the effort.” If opposition to the idea
would be strong from at least some segments of the bar in the United
States,71 in other nations with a less entrepreneurial view of the
function of class counsel in particular and lawyers in general it would
no doubt be anathema to many, a step much too far over the line that
has been crossed only with difficulty to allow a tamer form of
72
contingent fee than exists in America. The idea may still be “worth
73
further scholarly consideration,” but it is highly unlikely to be a
realistic alternative for other systems with class actions any time at all
soon.
B. Commercial Insurance
If class counsel are unlikely to act as insurers against the downside risk of fee liability for a losing class, protection against the risk
might come from commercial insurers. Legal-expense insurance is
74
fairly common in some Continental nations, partly because of the
established threat of liability for a winning adversary’s fees, and has
spread in England as Legal Aid cutbacks took away the protection
from such liability that had been afforded to covered cases.75 But the
68. See Hensler & Rowe, supra note 32, at 154-56.
69. See id. at 156-59.
70. Id. at 153.
71. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 67.
72. For a limited exception in Australia, see Clark & Harris, supra note 5, at 302
(describing case in which Federal Court awarded costs against counsel for losing plaintiff class
when “the firm gave no consideration, or no proper consideration, to the question whether the
federal claim had any prospect of success.”) (footnote omitted).
73. Hensler & Rowe, supra note 32, at 153.
74. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 29, at 270 (citing much larger total amounts paid for legalexpense insurance premiums in France and Germany than in Britain).
75. See id. at 272 (with Legal Aid cutbacks and launching of conditional fees, “[s]everal
[British] companies offered plaintiffs insurance against liability for defendants’ costs, selling
over a thousand policies a month within a year.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 302 (reporting
premium increases and agreement to make premiums recoverable from losing defendants);
Woodroffe, supra note 18, at 355-56 (describing “Accident Line Protect” policies available in
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same collective-action dilemma that arises with liability of class
representatives or members for fees.76 seems to pose an obstacle to
the workability of such insurance: it would impose a disproportionate
cost on individual representatives if they were liable for the full
premiums, and it would usually be prohibitively difficult to collect pro
rata shares from the class members. Only if class counsel were liable
for shifted fees might it be workable to rely on insurance, as they
could decide whether to self-insure or seek other coverage. But the
near-certain political unviability of counsel’s liability in the first
place77 makes this combination appear at most a highly distant
possibility.
C. Public and Third-Party Private Funding
If class representatives, members, and counsel and commercial
insurance all seem unpromising as ways to deal with the risk of
liability for a shifted defense fee, still other sources might be possible.
Although financing by a private group such as an interested
association or union might be conceivable in some cases for the fees
of a class’s own counsel, it seems too much to expect such entities to
volunteer to bear loser-pays fee liability at all often when they are not
parties facing it involuntarily. So the main possible source would be
the kinds of publicly created funds that exist in Ontario and Quebec,
which can be liable for both the fees of class counsel and those of a
winning defendant.78 After an initial appropriation, such funds can be
structured to be self-financing out of a contingent share of recoveries
in successful cases, although there is always the possibility of funddepleting awards that could require a perhaps difficult political
decision whether to provide another subvention.

Britain after Legal Aid cutbacks). See generally Hodges, supra note 29, at 336 (describing
rationale and working of legal aid’s exempting covered claims from usual loser-pays rule, and
discussing prospect of insurance coverage for risk of fee liability in multi-party actions).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
77. See supra text accompanying note 71.
78. See supra notes 49, 51. It would also be conceivable to have the fund’s choice to
finance a class action mean that winning defendants would not be eligible to an award of fees
from anyone on the plaintiffs’ side, including the fund, as has been the practice in individual
cases that receive legal aid under the British scheme. See, e.g., Woodroffe, supra note 18, at 347
(when “one party is legally aided . . . and the other is privately funded, the latter, when
successful, will not normally receive his or her costs against the legal aid fund.”). But it would
be unfair to defendants to have their ability to recover fees when they win depend on whether
the fund had chosen to finance their adversaries. If the loser-pays rule is to be relaxed or
abolished for class actions, it would be better for that to come about on a less arbitrary basis.
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Further, it might limit access too much to rely solely on such a
fund, by requiring its approval for any private damage class action to
proceed, to cover the risk of liability for a class’s winning adversary’s
fees; caution, error, backlog, or insufficient resources could keep a
fund from aiding what might be viable and meritorious actions. And
under loser-pays, such actions might be too unlikely to proceed at all
without support from the fund. The high activity of the Quebec
fund79 makes it appear that such an entity can be a significant source
of support, but if fund financing should not be the sole way of
bringing a class action a system could find itself back at the hard
choice: keep loser-pays with its likely evasions and access-inhibiting
features, given the inadequacy of the alternatives canvassed above—
or abandon or modify the loser-pays rule for some or all class actions.
The next section considers different ways in which a system could do
so, although variations in local preferences and conditions counsel
against my recommending any one.
D. Modifying or Abandoning Loser-Pays
A threshold concern with possible changes in loser-pay rules, to
accommodate perceived needs of class actions, would be whether to
make the changes applicable generally or to limit them to the class
context. The latter would be an obvious starting point, if the
justifications for change came from the peculiarities of class actions
such as the difficulty of making loser-pays work in that context; but so
limiting any changes would raise questions of discrimination and
possibly skewed incentives for choice between class and non-class
litigation. (Unless the modification took the form of a primarily oneway pro-prevailing-plaintiff rule, which may be unlikely to win
acceptance in systems with a strong two-way loser-pays tradition,80 it
is not clear that softening or eliminating loser-pays would regularly
cut one way or the other in affecting parties’ choices. Tempering or
abolishing the rule would mean that plaintiffs would be less likely
both to collect fees from the other side when they won and to have to
pay them when they lost. Risk aversion would push toward choosing
the class form to avoid down-side risk, but whether those with
deciding voices were risk-averse would depend on who bore risk.) In
any event, the class-action tail should probably not wag the entire dog
79. See supra note 48.
80. See, e.g., Morabito, supra note 12, at 262 (while favoring public funding and abolition of
loser-pays for Australian class actions, arguing against general one-way rule as unfairly
imbalanced and smacking of punishment).
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when a system is deciding on whether to keep, modify, or abolish
loser-pays; and the seeming unlikelihood of its abolition in systems
where loser-pays has been so long and deeply entrenched makes it
seem sensible to focus on possible abolition or modification in the
class-action context alone.81
Abolition of the loser-pays rule, so that neither losing defendants
nor someone on the side of a losing plaintiff class would be liable for
the other side’s fees, is exactly what the Ontario Law Revision
Commission recommended (with limited exceptions) for class actions
82
there. Interestingly, the OLRC’s recommendation was not followed
in Ontario but was largely adopted in British Columbia. Quebec has
still a third approach retaining loser-pays but reducing the class representative’s liability to a nominal sum. As Professor Watson explains:
British Columbia adopted the Ontario Law Reform Commission’s
recommendation, rendering the representative plaintiff virtually
immune from paying costs—she is only liable if the action is
“frivolous or vexatious” (merely losing is not enough). Quebec
allows for costs against the representative plaintiff, but after one
very large costs award the legislation changed allowing only
nominal costs to be paid (on the scale of the small claims court).
Ontario is the most extreme. The legislation provides that costs can
be awarded against a losing representative plaintiff unless the court
is of the view that the action was a “test case, raised a novel point of
law or involved a matter of public interest.” To date, relatively few
significant costs awards have been made against plaintiffs, and
83
representative plaintiffs have largely avoided having to pay costs.

With still different approaches, Australia and England complete
an illustrative array of possible ways of dealing with the loser-pays
rule in class actions where that rule remains generally the norm.
Australia retains the rule, but with specific provision that class
members other than the representative cannot be liable for a winning

81. But see South African Law Comm’n, supra note 11, at 70-72 (recommending court
discretion to apply general loser-pays rule in context of proposed class-action regime, although
with little discussion of impact of rule on viability of class actions).
82. See OLRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 704-09 (recommending “no-way” costs rule
except when “it would be unjust to deprive the successful party of costs” when reasonable
plaintiff should not have sought class certification, id. at 709 (footnote omitted), and at any stage
“in the event of vexatious, frivolous, or abusive conduct on the part of any party,” id. (footnote
omitted)). See also Morabito, supra note 12, at 255-63 (arguing for rejection of loser-pays rule
in class actions).
83. Watson, supra note 4, at 274-75 (footnotes omitted). For more detail on the
background and content of the Quebec nominal-costs approach, see Fox, supra note 65, at 13233.
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defendant’s fees.84 And England, with its unique opt-in approach,
also retains the rule while making all class members liable for
common and individual costs.85 Putting aside the English approach as
unsuited for other nations’ regimes with their opt-out features, two of
the remaining four alternatives seem particularly questionable. The
Australian system creates incentives for evasions and counter86
measures, and Ontario’s limited-exception approach has the same
problem for cases in which class representatives might be liable87
while adding ex ante uncertainty about whether a case will come
within one of the exceptions. Still, both Australia and Ontario seem
to have significant class-action practice. With the device available it
appears that at least a few will find ways to use it despite the
obstacles, although with some costs in both hypocrisy and satellite
maneuvering and probably at a lower rate of use than would
otherwise be the case.
V. CONCLUSION
As this survey of potential approaches to attorney-fee issues in
class actions makes clear, this limited part of the class-action field can
involve what may be surprisingly numerous and complex choices.
Still one further potential feature should be mentioned, if only to
explain why it should not apply in class actions: that of an offer-ofjudgment rule like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 and many
counterpart state rules in the United States, or the payment-intocourt device in England.
Such rules, designed to encourage
settlement, permit a defendant to make a formal offer of a certain
amount, with the plaintiff subject to a consequence—such as liability
for defendant’s post-offer non-fee costs and/or attorney fees—if the
plaintiff does not accept and does not do better in the final result.
Whatever the virtues or defects of such rules generally, they should
not apply in class actions because they presume that plaintiffs have
autonomy to accept or reject such offers, which a plaintiff class does
not given the requirement of court approval of settlements. “It would
be unfair to hold claimants liable . . . if they sought to accept a formal
offer but did not win court approval.”88
84. See Clark & Harris, supra note 5, at 301.
85. See supra note 66.
86. See supra note 63.
87. See id.
88. 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 68.03[3], at 68-14 (3d
ed. 2003) (mentioning also problems with trying to collect from class members, onerousness of
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In addition to that merciful if small bit of simplification, this
survey can conclude on a note of optimism. While the choices among
approaches to fee issues that face framers of class-action rules in
systems with loser-pays rules and restrictions on contingent fees can
be difficult and may become politically sensitive, these choices
nonetheless offer considerable opportunity for trying to shape the
class device so that it is usable in meritorious cases while reducing
conflicts of interest and incentives to pursue questionable claims.
And although having class actions does raise tensions with some
existing norms and practices concerning attorney fees in many
systems, the fee provisions applicable in class actions can be framed in
ways that accommodate them at least somewhat to traditions that
claim strong adherence. Some adjustments to existing fee rules,
perhaps uncomfortable ones, seem essential for the creation of a
viable class-action regime, but there is a considerable range of choices
that are not limited to American-style approaches with what strike
many as their excesses. So one can say to those otherwise inclined to
adopt the class device, when it comes to framing rules governing
attorney fees, “Come on in—water fine.”

imposing liability on class representative, and possible threat to zealous pursuit of class’s
claims).

